Novel Intrusion Detection using Probabilistic Neural Network and
  Adaptive Boosting by Tran, Tich Phuoc et al.
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009 
Novel Intrusion Detection using Probabilistic Neural 
Network and Adaptive Boosting 
Tich Phuoc Tran, Longbing Cao 
Faculty of Engineering and Information 
Technology 
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia 
{tiptran, lbcao}@it.uts.edu.au 
Dat Tran 
Faculty of Information Sciences and 
Engineering 
University of Canberra, Australia 
Dat.Tran@canberra.edu.au 
 
Cuong Duc Nguyen 
School of Computer Science and 
Engineering 
International University, HCMC, Vietnam 
ndcuong@hcmiu.edu.vn 
 
 
 
Abstract— This article applies Machine Learning 
techniques to solve Intrusion Detection problems within 
computer networks. Due to complex and dynamic nature 
of computer networks and hacking techniques, detecting 
malicious activities remains a challenging task for 
security experts, that is, currently available defense 
systems suffer from low detection capability and high 
number of false alarms. To overcome such performance 
limitations, we propose a novel Machine Learning 
algorithm, namely Boosted Subspace Probabilistic Neural 
Network (BSPNN), which integrates an adaptive boosting 
technique and a semi-parametric neural network to 
obtain good trade-off between accuracy and generalty. As 
the result, learning bias and generalization variance can 
be significantly minimized. Substantial experiments on 
KDD-99 intrusion benchmark indicate that our model 
outperforms other state-of-the-art learning algorithms, 
with significantly improved detection accuracy, minimal 
false alarms and relatively small computational 
complexity.  
Keywords- Intrusion Detection, Neural Network, 
Adaptive Boosting 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As more and more corporations rely on computers 
and networks for communications and critical business 
transactions, securing digital information has become 
one of the largest concerns of the business community. 
A powerful security system is not only a requirement 
but essential to the livelihood of enterprises. In recent 
years, there has been a great deal of research conducted 
in this area to develop intelligent and automated 
security tools which can fight the latest cyber attacks. 
Alongside with static defense mechanisms such as 
keeping operating systems up-to-date or deploying 
firewalls at critical network segments for access 
control, more advanced defense systems, namely 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), are becoming an 
important part of today’s network security architectures. 
Particularly, IDS can be used to monitor computers or 
networks for unauthorized activities based on network 
traffic or system usage behaviors, thereby detect if a 
system is targeted by a network attack such as a denial 
of service attack. 
The majority of currently existing IDS face a 
number of challenges such as low detection rates which 
can miss serious intrusion attacks and high false alarm 
rates, which falsely classifies a normal connection as an 
attack and therefore obstructs legitimate user access to 
the network resources [1]. These problems are due to 
the sophistication of the attacks and their intended 
similarities to normal behavior. More intelligence is 
brought into IDS by means of Machine Learning (ML). 
Theoretically, it is possible for a ML algorithm to 
achieve the best performance, i.e. it can minimize the 
false alarm rate and maximize the detection accuracy. 
However, this normally requires infinite training sample 
sizes (theoretically) [2]. In practice, this condition is 
impossible due to limited computational power and 
real-time response requirement of IDS. IDS must be 
active in real time and they cannot allow much delay 
because this would cause a bottleneck to the whole 
network.  
To overcome the above limitations of currently 
existing IDS, we propose an efficient Boosted Subspace 
Probabilistic Neural Network (BSPNN) to enhance the 
performance of intrusion detection for rare and 
complicated attacks. BSPNN combines and improves a 
Vector Quantized-Generalized Regression Neural 
Network (VQ-GRNN) with an ensemble technique to 
improve detection accuracy while minimizing 
computation overheads by tuning of models. Because 
this method combines the virtues of boosting and neural 
network technologies, it has both high data fitting 
capability and high system robustness. To evaluate our 
approach, substantial experiments are conducted on the 
KDD-99 intrusion detection benchmark. The proposed 
algorithm clearly demonstrates superior classification 
performance compared with other well-known 
techniques in terms of bias and variance for the real life 
problems.  
II. NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION AND 
RELATED WORKS 
Because most computers today are connected to the 
Internet, network security has become a major concern 
for organizations throughout the world. Alongside the 
existing techniques for preventing intrusions such as 
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encryption and firewalls, Intrusion Detection 
technology has established itself as an emerging 
research field that is concerned with detecting 
unauthorized access and abuse of computer systems 
from both internal users and external offenders. An 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is defined as a 
protection system that monitors computers or networks 
for unauthorized activities based on network traffic or 
system usage behaviors, thereby detecting if a system is 
targeted by a network attack such as a denial of service 
attack  [4]. In response to those identified adversarial 
transactions, IDS can inform relevant authorities to take 
corrective actions. 
There are a large number of IDS available on the 
market to complement firewalls and other defense 
techniques. These systems are categorized into two 
types of IDS, namely (1) misuse-based detection in 
which events are compared against pre-defined patterns 
of known attacks and (2) anomaly-based detection 
which relies on detecting the activities deviating from 
system “normal” operations. 
In addition to the overwhelming volume of 
generated network data, rapidly changing technologies 
present a great challenge for today’s security systems 
with respect to attack detection speed, accuracy and 
system adaptability. In order to overcome such 
limitations, there has been considerable research 
conducted to apply ML algorithms to achieve a 
generalization capability from limited training data. 
That means, given known intrusion signatures, a 
security system should be able to detect similar or new 
attacks. Various techniques such as association rules, 
clustering, Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines, 
Genetic Algorithms, Neural Networks, and others have 
been developed to detect intrusions. This section 
provides a brief literature review on these technologies 
and related frameworks.  
One of the rule-based methods which is commonly 
used by early IDS is the Expert System (ES) [3, 4]. In 
such a system, the knowledge of human experts is 
encoded into a set of rules. This allows more effective 
knowledge management than that of a human expert in 
terms of reproducibility, consistency and completeness 
in identifying activities that match the defined 
characteristics of misuse and attacks. However, ES 
suffers from low flexibility and robustness. Unlike ES, 
data mining approaches derive association rules and 
frequent episodes from available sample data, not from 
human experts. Using these rules, Lee et. al. developed 
a data mining framework for the purpose of intrusion 
detection [5, 6]. In particular, system usage behaviors 
are recorded and analyzed to generate rules which can 
recognize misuse attacks. The drawback of such 
frameworks is that they tend to produce a large number 
of rules and thereby, increase the complexity of the 
system. 
Decision trees are one of the most commonly used 
supervised learning algorithms in IDS [7-11] due to its 
simplicity, high detection accuracy and fast adaptation. 
Another high performing method is Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN) which can model both linear and non-
linear patterns. ANN-based IDS [12-15] have achieved 
great successes in detecting difficult attacks.  For 
unsupervised intrusion detection, data clustering 
methods can be applied [16, 17]. These methods 
involve computing a distance between numeric features 
and therefore they cannot easily deal with symbolic 
attributes, resulting in inaccuracy.  
Another well-known ML techniques used in IDS is 
Naïve Bayes classifiers  [7]. Because Naïve Bayes 
assumes that features are independent, which is often 
not the case for intrusion detection, correlated features 
may degrade its performance. In [18], the authors apply 
a Bayesian network for IDS. The network appears to be 
attack specific and its size grows rapidly as the number 
of features and attack types increase.  
Beside popular decision trees and ANN, Support 
Vector Machines (SVMs) are also a good candidate for 
intrusion detection systems [14, 19] which can provide 
real-time detection capability, deal with large 
dimensionality of data. SVMs plot the training vectors 
in high dimensional feature space through nonlinear 
mapping and labeling each vector by its class. The data 
is then classified by determining a set of support 
vectors, which are members of the set of training inputs 
that outline a hyperplane in the feature space.  
Several other AI paradigms including linear genetic 
programming [20] , Hidden Markov Model [21], 
Columbia Model [22] and Layered Conditional 
Random Fields [23] have been applied for the design of 
IDS. 
III. BOOSTED SUBSPACE PROBABILISTIC NEURAL 
NETWORK (BSPNN) 
A. Bias-Variance-Computation Dilemma  
Several ML techniques have been adopted in the 
Network Security domain with certain success; 
however, there remain severe limitations. Firstly, we 
consider Artificial Neural Network (ANN) because of 
its wide popularity and well-known characteristics. As a 
flexible “model-free" learning method, ANN can fit 
training data very well and thus provide a low learning 
bias. However, they are susceptible to overfitting, 
which can cause instability in generalization   [24]. 
Recent remedies try to improve the model stability by 
reducing generalization variance at the cost of worse 
learning bias, i.e. allowing underfitting. However, 
underfitting is not acceptable for some applications 
requiring high classification accuracy. Therefore, a 
system which can achieve both stable generalization 
and accurate learning is imperative for applications as 
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in Intrusion Detection [19]. Mathematically, both bias 
and variance may be reduced at the same time given 
infinite sized models. However, this is infeasible since 
computing resources must be limited in real life. We 
develop a learning algorithm which provides a good 
tradeoff for learning bias, generalization variance and 
computational requirement motivated by the need of an 
accurate detection system for Intrusion Detection. 
B. Objectives 
This paper is inspired by a light-weight ANN 
model, namely Vector Quantized-Generalized 
Regression Neural Network (VQ-GRNN) [25], which 
reduces the nonparametric GRNN [26] to a semi-
parametric model by applying vector quantization 
techniques on the training data, i.e. clustering the input 
space into a smaller subspace. Compared with GRNN 
method which incorporates every training vector into its 
structure, VQ-GRNN only applies on a smaller number 
of clusters of input data. This significantly improves the 
robustness of the algorithm (low variance), but also 
controls its learning accuracy to some extent [24]. To 
make the VQ-GRNN suitable for Intrusion Detection 
problems, i.e. enhancing its accuracy, we propose the 
Boosted Subspace Probabilistic Neural Network 
(BSPNN) which combines VQ-GRNN and Ensemble 
Learning technique.  Ensemble methods such as 
Boosting [27] iteratively learn multiple classifiers (base 
classifiers) on different distributions of training data. It 
particularly guides changes of the training data to direct 
further classifiers toward more “difficult cases”, i.e. 
putting more weights for previously misclassified 
instances. It then combines base classifiers in such a 
way that the composite – boosted learner – outperforms 
the single classifiers. Amongst popular boosting 
variants, we choose Adaptive Boosting or AdaBoost 
[28] to improve performance of VQ-GRNN. AdaBoost 
is the most widely adopted method which allows the 
designer to continue adding weak learners whose 
accuracy is only moderate until some desired low 
training error has been achieved. AdaBoost is 
“adaptive” in the sense that it does not require prior 
knowledge of the accuracy of these hypotheses [27]. 
Instead, it measures the accuracy of a base hypothesis at 
each iteration and sets its parameters accordingly. 
Although classifier combinations (as in boosting) 
can improve generalization performance, correlation 
between individual classifiers can be harmful to the 
final composite model. Moreover, it is widely accepted 
that generalization performance of a combined 
classifier is not necessarily achieved by combining 
classifiers with better individual performance but by 
including independent classifiers in the ensemble [9]. 
Therefore, such independence condition among 
individual classifiers which is normally termed as 
orthogonality, diversity or disagreement is required to 
obtain a good ensemble.  
C. Model description 
As shown in Figure 1, the proposed BSPNN 
algorithm has two major modules: the Adaptive Booster 
and the Modified Probabilistic Classifier. 
Given the input data    , 	
|  1 …  
where output vector 	  1 … , the BSPNN algorithm 
aims to produce a classifier F such that: 

  	 
In this research, we implement F (referred to as 
Adaptive Booster), using SAMME algorithm [29].  
F learns by iteratively training a Modified 
Probabilistic Classifier f on weighted data samples S 
and their weights are updated by the Distribution 
Generator according to previously created models of f. 
This base learner f is actually a modified version of the 
emerging VQ-GRNN model [25] (called Modified 
GRNN Base learner) in which the input data space is 
reduced significantly (by the Weighted vector 
quantization module) and its output is computed by a 
linearly weighted mixture of Radial Basis Function 
(RBF). This process is repeated until F reaches a 
desired number of iterations or its Mean Squared Error 
(MSE) approaches an appropriate level. The base 
hypotheses returned from f are finally combined by the 
Hypothesis Aggregator: 

    . 



 
This combination depends not only on the 
misclassification error of previously added   but also 
the diversity   of the ensemble at that time. The 
Diversity Checker  measures ensemble diversity by 
using Kohavi-Wolpert variance [30] (which is denoted 
by the hypothesis weighting coefficient ). To avoid 
any confusion, the adaptive booster F is called the 
master algorithm while f refers to the base learner. 
They are described in greater details in next sections. 
1) Adaptive Booster 
The Adaptive Booster iteratively produces base 
hypotheses on a weighted training dataset. The weights 
are updated adaptively based on the classification 
performance of component hypotheses. The generated 
hypotheses are then integrated via a weighted sum 
based on their diversity.  
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Figure 1.  BSPNN high-level design view 
TABLE I.  ADAPTIVE BOOSTER ALGORITHM 
Input:    , 	
, … , , 	
 and associated distribution W 
Initialize  
   for all i=1…N, ! 
    
Do for t = 1 … T 
Generate base classifiers 
Train a classifier on the weighed sample {, "#
} using the Modified Probabilistic Classifier and obtain hypothesis $#
:  &
'0,1)*  
Compute Kohavi-Wolpert variance (!+
) of current ensemble 
!+, 
    .-. ∑ 0123 45 6 012372   
Where L and 0123 are the number of base classifiers generated so far in the ensemble and the number of classifiers that correctly 
classifies 2. We have L=t. 
Compute class probability estimates 
89+
:
   6 1
. ;log ?@#

 6 * ∑ log ?@A
#

*@B C , D  1, . . ,   
Where ?@#

  EFGHI1$#

  DJ3 is the weighted class probability of class k.  
Update weights  
+, 
  "#
. exp ;6 *N* . log ?#

. $#

C ,   1, . . , O  
Where ?
  EFGH
 
Renormalize W 
  PQ∑ PRSRTU ,   1 …   
End for 
Output 
VWXYZ
  argmax@ ∑ !+
. V@#

#^     
 
2) Modified Probabilistic Classifier (Base 
Learner) 
The Modified Probabilistic Classifier serves as the 
base learner which can be trained on {, _#} repeatedly 
by the Adatptive Booster to obtain the hypothesis 
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$#:  & '61, `1) 
In each boosting iteration, a base hypothesis is 
created with associated accuracy and diversity 
measures. From this information, the data weights are 
updated for the next iteration and the final weighting of 
that hypothesis in the joint classification is computed.  
We adapt VQ-GRNN [25] as a base learner in our 
BSPNN model.  VQ-GRNN is closely related to 
Specht’s GRNN [26] and PNN [31] classifiers. This 
adaptation of VQ-GRNN can produce confidence-rated 
outputs and it is modified such that it utilizes weights 
associated with training examples (to compute cluster 
center vectors and find a single smoothing factor) and 
incorporates these weights as penalties for 
misclassifications (e.g. weighted MSE). This modified 
version of VQ-GRNN is similar to the original one in 
that a single kernel bandwidth is tuned to achieve 
satisfactory learning. They both cluster close training 
vectors according to a very simple procedure related to 
vector quantization. A number of equally sized radial 
basis functions are placed at each and every center 
vector location. These functions are approximated: 
 1 6  , a3 b c@
de
f
@1 6 g@ , a3 
This approximation is reasonable because the  
vectors are close to each other in the input vector space. 
Using this idea, the VQ-GRNN’s equation can be 
generalized [25]: 
	h13  ∑ c	1 6 g , a3
f
∑ c1 6 g , a3f
 
Where g is the center vector for class i in the input 
space, , a
 is the radial basis function with centre x 
and the width parameter a , 	  is the ouput related 
related to g, c is the number of vectors 2  associated 
with centre g . ∑ c  i  is the total number of 
training vectors. 
The above formula can be extended to a multiclass 
classification problem by redefining the output vector 
as a K-dimensional vector (K is the number of classes): 
	  	, … , 	*^ 
where 	@ is the class membership probability of the 
k-th class of the vector . If the vector    is of class k, 
then  	@  1.0 and  	@A  0 for the remaining vector 
elements (D j Dk). An input vector x is classified to 
class-k if the k-th element of the output vector has the 
highest magnitude. 
To suit ensemble learning, VQ-GRNN is adapted 
such that it incoperates the weights associated with each 
training vector into the learning process, i.e. using them 
in cluster center formation and Mean Square Error 
(MSE) calculation for realzing the smoothing factor a. 
Such modifications make VQ-GRNN specially suited 
for boosting. In particular, the center vector g  is 
computed as: 
g@ 
∑ "de
c@  
where c@  is the number of training vectors 
belonging to a cluster k; "  is the weight associated 
with . 
VQ-GRNN’s learning involves finding the optimal 
bandwidth a  giving the minimum MSE. In our 
implementation, a Weighted MSE (WMSE) is used 
instead:  
"lm  ∑ '"	h
 6 	
)
n
  
where o  and 	h  are the associated weight and 
prediction of an example  , 	
, i = 1…N 
3) Remarks on BSPNN 
The high accuracy of BSPNN can be attributed to 
the boosting effects of SAMME method implemented 
in the Adaptive Booster module. By sufficiently 
handling the multiclass problem and using confidence-
rated predictions, SAMME can maximize the 
distribution margins of the training data [32]. Also, our 
implementation of Kohavi-Wolpert variance (KW) [30] 
in the reweighting of hypotheses in the joint 
classification can effectively enforce the ensemble 
diversity. The Modified Probabilistic Classifier has very 
fast adaptation and it is modified to better integrate with 
the Adaptive Booster module. Particularly, after being 
modified, it can produce confidence rated outputs and 
fully utilize the weights given by the booster into 
learning process. In the next sections, we apply BSPNN 
into specific Intrusion Detection problems. 
IV. APPLICATION TO NETWORK INTRUSION 
DETECTION 
Current IDS suffer from low detection accuracy and 
insufficient system robustness for new and rare security 
breaches. In this section, we apply our BSPNN to 
identify known and novel attacks in the KDD-99 
dataset [1], containing TCP/IP connection records. Each 
record consisted of 41 attributes (features) and one 
target value (labeled data) which indicates whether a 
connection is Normal or an attack. There are 40 types of 
attacks, classified into four major categories, namely 
Probing  (Probe) (collect information of target system 
prior to an attack),  Denial of Service (DoS) (prevent  
legitimate  requests  to a network resource by 
consuming the bandwidth or overloading computational 
resources),  User-to-Root  (U2R)  (attackers with 
normal user level access gain privileges of root user),  
and  Remote-to-Local  (R2L) (unauthorized users  gain 
the ability to execute commands locally).   
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Table 2 describes the components of KDD-99 
dataset (referred to as Whole KDD): 10% KDD 
containing 26 known attack types (for training) and 
Corrected KDD containing 14 novel attacks (for 
testing). 
TABLE II.  KDD-99 COMPONENT DATASETS [1] 
Dataset DoS Probe U2R R2L Total Attack Total Normal 
Whole KDD 3883370 41102 52 1126 3925650 972780 
10% KDD 391458 4107 52 1126 396743 97277 
Corrected KDD 229853 4166 70 16347 250436 60593 
 
A. Experiment Setup 
1) Cost-Sensitive Evaluation 
Because an error on a particular class may not be 
equally serious as errors on other classes, we should 
consider misclassification cost for intrusion detection. 
Given a test set, the average cost of a classifier is 
calculated as below [1]: 
VGpq   ∑ ∑ VGOl, r
 s VGpql, r
t2t ( 4) 
Where 
N: total number of connections in the dataset 
ConfM(i,j): the entry at row i, column j in the 
confusion matrix. 
CostM(i,j): the entry at row i, column j in the cost 
matrix. 
2) Datasets Creation 
First, we consider anomaly detection where only 
normal connection records are available for training. 
Any connections that differ from these normal records 
are classified as “abnormal” without further specifying 
which attack categories it actually belongs to. For this 
purpose, we filter all known intrusions from the 10% 
KDD to form a pure normal dataset (Norm).  
For misuse detection, we inject the 26 known 
attacks into Norm to classify 14 novel ones. For 
example, from the Probe attacks that appeared in the 
training set (ipsweep., nmap., portspeep., satan.), we 
aim to detect unseen Probe attacks that were only 
included in testing data (mscan., saint.). In [33], 
artificial anomalies are added to the training data to 
help the learner discover a boundary around the 
available training data. The method particularly changes 
the value of one feature of a connection while leaving 
other features unaltered. However, we do not adopt this 
method due to its high false alarm rate and its 
unconfirmed assumption that the boundary is very close 
to the known data and that they do not intersect one 
another. Instead, we group 26 known intrusions into 13 
clusters V, … , Vu  (note that these clusters are not 
artificially generated but real incidents, available in 
“10% KDD” set) and use it for classification. Each 
cluster contains intrusions that require similar features 
for effective detection and this method, as detailed in 
[33], is not influenced by cluster orders.   
In our experiments, we first created 13 datasets 
v, … , vu , as shown in Table 3, by incrementally 
adding each cluster V into the normal dataset (Norm) to 
simulate the evolution of new intrusions: 
v@  GFw `  V
@

 v@N ` V@ 
The BSPNN and other learning methods are then 
tested against the “Corrected KDD” testing set, 
containing both known and unknown attacks.  
B. Experiment Result 
1) Anomaly Detection 
We train BSPNN on the pure Normal dataset (Norm) 
to detect anomalies in “Corrected KDD” testing set. 
Table 4 shows that our BSPNN obtains competitive 
detection rate compared with [33] while achieves 
significantly lower false alarm rate (1.1%), minimizing 
major drawbacks of anomaly detection.  
2) Misuse Detection 
To test the effect of having known intrusions in the 
training set on the overall performance, we run BSPNN 
on the 13 training sets: v, … , vu. Its detection rates 
(DR) on different attack categories are displayed in 
Figure 2. We could discover a general trend of 
increasing performance as more intrusions are added 
into training set. In particular, detection of R2L attacks 
requires less known intrusion data (DR starts rising at 
vx) than that of other classes. 
Using the full training set (vu), we test our BSPNN 
against other existing methods, including the KDD-99 
winner [8], the rule-based PNrule approach  [34], the 
multi-class Support Vector Machine [19], the Layered 
Conditional Random Fields Framework (LCRF) [23], 
the Columbia Model [22] and the Decision Tree method 
[11]. Their Detection Rate (DR) and False Alarm Rate 
(FAR) are reported in Table 5, with highest DR and 
lowest FAR for each class in bold. 
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TABLE III.  CLUSTERS OF KNOWN INTRUSION 
8  
back 
8y 
buffer_overflow, loadmodule, perl, rootkit 
8z 
ftp_write, warezclient, warezmaster 
8{ 
guess_passwd 
8| 
imap 
8} 
land 
8~ 
portsweep, satan 
8 
ipsweep, nmap 
8 
multihop 
8  
neptune 
8   
phf 
8 y 
pod, teardrop 
8 z 
spy, smurf 
 
 
TABLE IV.  ANOMALY DETECTION RATE (DR) AND FALSE ALARM RATE (FAR) FOR ANOMALY DETECTION 
 Fan et. [33] BSPNN 
Anomaly DR 94.26 94.31 
FAR 2.02 1.12 
 
Figure 2.  Detection Rate on Datasets for misuse detection 
For Probe and DoS attacks, BSPNN can achieve 
slightly better DR than other algorithms with very 
competitive FAR. Though improvement for detection of 
Normal class is not significant, our model can, in fact, 
get a remarkably low FAR. In addition, a clear 
performance superiority is claimed for BSPNN in the 
case of U2R and R2L classes.  
It is also important to note that, since KDD-99 
dataset is unbalanced (U2R and R2L appeared rarely), 
the baseline models can only classify the major classes 
and performs poorly on other minor ones, while our 
BSPNN exhibits superior detection power for all 
classes.  Significant improvement in detection of more 
dangerous attacks (U2R, R2L) leads to lower total 
weight of misclassification of 0.1523 compared with 
0.2332 of the KDD-99 winner. 
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TABLE V.  DETECTION RATE (DR) AND FALSE ALARM RATE (FR) FOR MISUSE DETECTION 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This research is inspired by the need of a highly performing 
but low in computation classifier for applications in Network 
Security. Particularly, the Boosted Subspace Probabilistic 
Neural Network (BSPNN) is proposed which combines two 
emerging algorithms, an adaptive boosting method and a 
probabilistic neural network. BSPNN retains the semi-
parametric characteristics of VQ-GRNN and therefore obtains 
low generalization variance while receives accuracy boosting 
from SAMME method (low bias). Though BSPNN requires 
more processing power due to the effect of boosting, the 
increased computation is still lower than GRNN or other 
boosted algorithms.  
Experiments on the KDD-99 network intrusion dataset 
show that our approach obtains superior performance in 
comparison with other state-of-the-art detection methods, 
achieving low learning bias and improved generalization at an 
affordable computational cost.  
REFERENCES 
 
[1] C. Elkan, "Results of the KDD’99 Classifier Learning," ACM  SIGKDD 
Explorations, vol. 1, pp. 63-64, 2000. 
[2] I. Kononenko and M. Kukar, Machine Learning and Data Mining: 
Introduction to Principles and Algorithms Horwood Publishing Limited, 
2007. 
[3] D. S. Bauer and M. E. Koblentz, "NIDX – an expert system  for real-
time network intrusion detection," in Proceeding of the  Computer 
Networking Symposium Washington, D.C., 1988, pp. 98-106. 
[4] K. Ilgun, R. Kemmerer, and P. Porras, "State transition  analysis: a rule-
based intrusion detection approach," IEEE  Transactions on Software 
Engineering, pp. 181-199, 1995. 
[5] W. Lee, S. Stolfo, and K. Mok, "Mining Audit Data to Build Intrusion 
Detection Models," Proc. Fourth International Conference Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining pp. 66-72, 1999. 
[6] W. Lee, S. Stolfo, and K. Mok, "A Data Mining Framework for Building 
Intrusion Detection Model," Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy, pp. 
120-132, 1999. 
[7] N. B. Amor, S. Benferhat, and Z. Elouedi, "Naive Bayes vs. Decision 
Trees in Intrusion Detection Systems," Proc. ACM Symp. Applied 
Computing, pp. 420-424, 2004. 
[8] B. Pfahringer, "Winning the KDD99 Classification Cup: Bagged 
Boosting," SIGKDD Explorations, vol. 1, pp. 65–66, 2000. 
[9] V. Miheev, A. Vopilov, and I. Shabalin, "The MP13 Approach to the 
KDD’99 Classifier Learning Contest," SIGKDD Explorations, vol. 1, pp. 
76–77, 2000. 
[10] I. Levin, "KDD-99 Classifier Learning Contest: LLSoft’s Results 
Overview," SIGKDD Explorations, vol. 1, pp. 67–75, 2000. 
[11] J.-H. Lee, J.-H. Lee, S.-G. Sohn, J.-H. Ryu, and T.-M. Chung, "Effective 
Value of Decision Tree with KDD 99 Intrusion Detection Datasets for 
Intrusion Detection System," in 10th International Conference on 
Advanced Communication Technology. vol. 2, 2008, pp. 1170-1175. 
[12] Z. Zhang, J. Li, C. N. Manikopoulos, J. Jorgenson, and J. Ucles, "HIDE: 
A Hierarchical Network Intrusion Detection System Using Statistical 
Preprocessing and Neural Network Classification," Proc. IEEE 
Workshop Information Assurance and Security, pp. 85-90, 2001. 
[13] J. Cannady, "Artificial neural networks for misuse  detection," in In 
Proceedings of the National Information Systems  Security Conference 
Arlington, VA, 1998. 
[14] S. Mukkamala, G. Janoski, and A. Sung "Intrusion  detection using 
neural networks and support vector machines," in International Joint 
Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN). vol. 2: IEEE, 2002, pp. 1702-
1707. 
[15] C. Jirapummin, N. Wattanapongsakorn, and P. Kanthamanon, "Hybrid 
neural networks for intrusion detection system," In  Proceedings of The 
2002 International Technical Conference On  
Circuits/Systems,Computers and Communications, 2002. 
[16] L. Portnoy, E. Eskin, and S. Stolfo, "Intrusion Detection with Unlabeled 
Data Using Clustering," Proc. ACM Workshop Data Mining Applied to 
Security (DMSA), 2001. 
[17] H. Shah, J. Undercoffer, and A. Joshi, "Fuzzy Clustering for Intrusion 
Detection," Proc. 12th IEEE International Conference Fuzzy Systems 
(FUZZ-IEEE ’03), vol. 2, pp. 1274-1278, 2003. 
 
 
 
N
or
m
a
l 
 
 
Pr
o
be
 
 
 
D
oS
 
 
 
U
2R
 
 
 
R2
L 
 
 
D
R/
FA
R 
(%
) 
KDD 99 winner [8] 99.5 83.3 97.1 13.2 8.4 DR 
27.0 35.2 0.1 28.6 1.2 FAR 
PNrule [34] 99.5 73.2 96.9 6.6 10.7 DR 
27.0 7.5 0.05 89.5 12.0 FAR 
Multi-class SVM [19] 99.6 75 96.8 5.3 4.2 DR 
27.8 11.7 0.1 47.8 35.4 FAR 
Layered Conditional Random Fields [23] - 98.60 97.40 86.30 29.60 DR 
- 0.91 0.07 0.05 0.35 FAR 
Columbia Model [22] - 96.7 24.3 81.8 5.9 DR 
Decision Tree [11] - 81.4 60.0 58.8 24.2 DR 
BSPNN 99.8 99.3 98.1 89.7 48.2 DR 
3.6 1.1 0.06 0.03 0.19 FAR 
90 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009 
[18] C. Kruegel, D. Mutz, W. Robertson, and F. Valeur, "Bayesian Event 
Classification for Intrusion Detection," Proc. 19th Annual Computer 
Security Applications Conference, pp. 14-23, 2003. 
[19] T. Ambwani, "Multi class support vector machine implementation to 
intrusion detection," in Proc. of IJCNN, 2003, pp. 2300-2305. 
[20] D. Song, M. I. Heywood, and A. N. Zincir-Heywood, "Training Genetic 
Programming on Half a Million Patterns: An Example from Anomaly 
Detection," IEEE Trans. Evolutionary Computation, vol. 9, pp. 225-239, 
2005. 
[21] W. Wang, X. H. Guan, and X. L. Zhang, "Modeling Program Behaviors 
by Hidden Markov Models for Intrusion Detection," Proc. International 
Conference Machine Learning and Cybernetics, vol. 5, pp. 2830-2835, 
2004. 
[22] W. Lee and S. Stolfo, "A Framework for Constructing  Features and 
Models for Intrusion Detection Systems," Information and System 
Security, vol. 4, pp. 227-261, 2000. 
[23] K. K. Gupta, B. Nath, and R. Kotagiri, "Layered Approach using 
Conditional Random Fields for Intrusion Detection," IEEE Transactions 
on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 5, 2008. 
[24] A. Zaknich, Neural Networks for Intelligent Signal Processing. Sydney: 
World Scientific Publishing, 2003. 
[25] A. Zaknich, "Introduction to the modified probabilistic neural network 
for general signal processing applications," IEEE Transactions on Signal 
Processing, vol. 46, pp. 1980-1990, 1998. 
[26] D. F. Spetch, "A general regression neural network," IEEE  Transactions 
on Neural Networks, vol. 2, pp. 568-576, 1991. 
[27] R. E. Schapire, "A brief introduction to boosting," in Proceedings of the 
Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San 
Francisco, CA, 1999, pp. 1401-1406. 
[28] Y. Freund and R. Schapire, "A decision-theoretic generation of on-line 
learning and an application to boosting," Journal of Computer and 
System Science, vol. 55, pp. 119–139, 1997. 
[29] J. Zhu, S. Rosset, H. Zhou, and T. Hastie, "Multiclass adaboost," The 
Annals of Applied Statistics, vol. 2, pp. 1290--1306., 2005. 
[30] R. Kohavi and D. Wolpert, "Bias plus variance decomposition  for zero-
one loss functions," in Proc. of International Conference on Machine 
Learning Italy, 1996, pp. 275-283. 
[31] D. F. Specht, "Probabilistic neural networks," Neural Networks, vol. 3, 
pp. 109-118, 1990. 
[32] J. Huang, S. Ertekin, Y. Song, H. Zha, and C. L. Giles, "Efficient 
Multiclass Boosting Classification with Active Learning," ICDM, 2007. 
[33] W. Fan, M. Miller, S. Stolfo, W. Lee, and P. Chan, "Using artificial 
anomalies to detect unknown and known network intrusions," 
Knowledge and Information Systems, vol. 6, pp. 507–527, 2004. 
[34] R. Agarwal and M. V. Joshi, "PNrule: A New Framework for  Learning 
Classifier Models in Data Mining," in A Case-Study in  Network 
Intrusion Detection, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
91 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
